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Domestic Support Issues in the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture 
P. Lynn Kennedy, Lars Brink, John Dyck, and Donald MacLaren 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) broke new ground when it 
introduced disciplines on domestic support for agriculture. It had long been realized that output-
promoting domestic subsidies could distort trade patterns even though they did not involve 
border measures. But it was widely assumed that countries would not allow such domestic 
measures to be discussed in trade talks or made subject to binding trade rules and limits on 
expenditures. The constraints on domestic support measures remain among the most 
controversial aspects of the URAA, and discussions about the next step in trade policy reform 
have indicated significant disagreements. These disagreements go to the heart of the objectives 
of domestic farm policy and the range of instruments that countries can use. This paper describes 
the current situation, the issues before negotiators, the positions of the main protagonists, and the 
analytical issues that remain to be resolved. 
I. Domestic Support Commitments in the Uruguay Round Agreement 
The URAA established bindings in the area of domestic agricultural support mainly 
through the limits placed on the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). Reduction 
commitments are intended to constrain domestic support measures that encourage agricultural 
production or raise consumer prices and are therefore considered to distort potential trade flows. 
The URAA also specifies measures not subject to reduction.  In addition to the de 
minimis provisions, countries are not required to include in Total AMS direct payments under 
certain production-limiting programs. More widely applicable are the exemptions for Green Box 
policies that are considered to have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production. The Peace Clause specifies that domestic support measures that fully conform to the 
Green Box provisions are non-actionable and exempt from a variety of actions (e.g., from the 
imposition of countervailing duties). In addition, developing countries can exempt a somewhat 
larger set of policy instruments from reduction.  
II. Current Situation 
The close link between the rules relating to domestic support as defined by the WTO and 
the overall development of agricultural policy means that any discussion of the current levels of 




highly concentrated in a few countries: the European Union, the United States and Japan account 
for 90 percent of total domestic support for the OECD area as a whole (OECD, 2001b). This 
section looks at the extent to which these and some other countries have reduced their “trade-
distorting” domestic support measures, as well as other major policy developments. 
III. Problems and Issues 
A number of factors potentially limit the effectiveness of the URAA in reducing support 
for domestic agriculture.  These include the following: 
1)  Payments exempt under the Green and Blue Box provisions cover a broad range of 
support measures.  Blue Box policies are still widely characterized as market 
distorting and many argue that current Green Box policies can result in distortions.  
Several countries have been able to meet their URAA obligations by shifting support 
to exempt (Blue and Green Box) policies without reducing their support.   
2)  Since the commitment is on Total AMS, not on product-specific AMS amounts, 
countries can reduce support for some products, while leaving support for other 
products untouched (or even raised from original levels).   
3)  The de minimis provisions create the potential for the continued support of 
commodity production at high levels.   
4)  The domestic administered support price may be a poor proxy for the internal market 
price while the fixed external reference price does not represent the actual border 
price, which brings into question the measures of price support as defined by the 
URAA.   
5)  The URAA does not provide specific criteria for determining a country’s 
development status. 
On the other hand, some members feel that the URAA is too restrictive in reducing 
support for domestic agriculture and neglects “non-trade” concerns.  They argue that the survival 
of their domestic agriculture is necessary for their food security and to provide a continuing 
stream of environmental and societal benefits that are joint products of agriculture.  These 
countries typically favor retention of the Blue Box and adjustment of the Green Box to more 
readily accommodate policies that support multi-functional aspects of agriculture. 
The perceived areas of ineffectiveness in the URAA identify areas for progress in the 
next agreement. These issues include the accommodation of  “non-trade” concerns; reductions in 
the AMS (including definition and criteria for exempt policies; consideration of inflation and 
exchange rate changes; the role of de minimis provisions; and total versus product-specific AMS 
commitments); the role of the Blue Box; the definition and perhaps limitation of Green Box 




IV. Members’ Positions on Domestic Support 
The paper reviews members’ proposals according to a set of choices that face negotiators.   
In constructing a new agreement, countries must decide whether to sort domestic support 
measures into categories (boxes) or not.  If the choice is not to use boxes, the issue then becomes 
one of determining the scope of the reduction and the level of cuts for overall support.  If the 
path of categorizing support is chosen, the question arises as to how policies should be defined 
and classified. The criteria for inclusion of policy instruments in the Green Box are perhaps the 
major issue for many countries.  After the decision to classify policies, the issue of appropriate 
reductions emerges.  A wide range of views is apparent on how to discipline particular types of 
policy and indeed whether to impose any limits on Green and Blue Box measures.  Views also 
differ on the extent to which developed and developing countries should be required to reduce 
support. 
V. Analysis of Options 
The varying country positions highlight the need for more analytical work to identify 
non-trade-distorting solutions. While questions pertaining to the quantity of support allowable 
and pace of reductions may be political in nature, identifying those disciplines on domestic 
support that minimize international market distortions is a task for economists. This section 
focuses on two general areas of analytical uncertainty: the significance of multifunctionality for 
the discipline on domestic support and the correct specification of Green, Blue and Amber Box 
criteria. 
V. Conclusions 
The paper concludes by raising several issues for the next round of multilateral talks on 
agriculture. Among these are concerns as to the structure to be adopted for the discipline 
categories; the type of development box to be established and whether a transition box should be 
established; whether AMS commitments should be on a product or sector-wide level; how the 
issue of multifunctional policies should be dealt with; whether allowable protection should be 
adjusted for inflation or exchange rate changes; and whether the use of de minimis should 
continue and if so, at what level.  
If the ultimate objective is to achieve freer trade, the next agreement must create an 
incentive structure that encourages countries to discontinue the use of trade-distorting domestic 
support policies. One insight that can be gleaned from the URAA is that a self-enforcing 
framework can be established that encourages countries to adopt less trade-distorting domestic 
support policies.  A second insight to be gained from the URAA is the need for well-defined 
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Domestic Support Issues in the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture 
P. Lynn Kennedy, Lars Brink, John Dyck, and Donald MacLaren
 * 
Introduction 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) broke new ground when it 
introduced disciplines on domestic support for agriculture. It had long been realized that output-
promoting domestic subsidies could distort trade patterns even though they did not involve 
border measures. But it was widely assumed that countries would not willingly allow such 
domestic measures to be discussed in trade talks, to be made subject to binding trade rules and to 
be subject to limits on the expenditure on such policies. The constraints on domestic support 
measures remain among the most controversial aspects of the Agreement on Agriculture, and 
discussions about the next step in trade policy reform have indicated significant disagreements. 
These disagreements go to the heart of the objectives of domestic farm policy and the range of 
instruments that countries can use. This paper describes the current situation, the issues before 
negotiators, the positions of the main protagonists, and the analytical issues that remain to be 
resolved. 
I. Domestic Support Commitments in the Uruguay Round Agreement 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) established bindings in the area 
of domestic agricultural support mainly through the limits placed on the Total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS). Reduction commitments are intended to constrain domestic 
support measures that encourage agricultural production and are therefore considered to distort 
potential trade flows. Members are in compliance with their domestic support reduction 
commitments in any year in which distorting domestic support (Current Total AMS) does not 
exceed the corresponding annual or final bound level specified in the member’s schedule of 
commitments.  
The AMS is calculated on a product-specific basis for each basic agricultural product 
receiving market price support, non-exempt direct payments, or any other non-product-specific 
support provided in favour of agricultural producers in general that is not exempted from a 
reduction commitment.  Support which is non-product specific is totaled into a non-product-
specific AMS.  The AMS includes support at both the national and sub-national levels.  
Subsidies included in the AMS include both budgetary outlays and revenue foregone by 
                                                 
* Kennedy is at Louisiana State University; Brink is with Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada; Dyck is with 
USDA/ERS; and MacLaren is at University of Melbourne.  The authors are indebted to Tim Josling and Praveen 




governments or their agents.  However, specific agricultural levies or fees paid by producers are 
deducted from the AMS.  
The AMS includes market price support (other than that implemented only through 
border measures) as well as payments. Market price support is defined as a price wedge 
multiplied by the quantity eligible to receive the applied administered price. The price wedge for 
a product is the difference between the applied administered price and an external reference 
price. The reference price can be an import price (c.i.f.: cost, insurance, and freight included) or 
an export price (f.o.b.: free on board). Significantly, the reference price is fixed at the 1986-88 
level. The applied administered price is not defined in the Agreement and can be (for example) a 
government purchase price or a minimum price in a price stabilization band. The quantity 
eligible to receive the administered price is not defined in the Agreement, with the consequence 
that some countries multiply the price wedge by total production, and others by a lower quantity, 
such as that actually purchased by an intervention agency. In the latter case, the purchases, 
perhaps in combination with import regulations, can have the effect of raising the price of the 
total quantity produced, though the market price support component of the AMS accounts for 
only a small part of this support.  
Fixing the reference price at the 1986-88 level means that the market price support 
component of the AMS does not vary inversely with changes in the world market prices, as 
would normally be expected of an indicator of price support. For example, when world market 
prices drop below the 1986-88 reference price, with an unchanged domestic price, the market 
price support component remains unchanged (Roberts, Podbury, and Hinchy, 2001). 
The Agreement does, however, specify measures that need not be subject to reduction. A 
member is not required to include in the calculation of its Total AMS or reduce i) product-
specific domestic support that does not exceed 5 percent of the member’s total value of 
production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year; and ii) non-product-specific 
domestic support that does not exceed 5 percent of the value of the member’s total agricultural 
production. For developing countries, this de minimis percentage is 10 percent for both i) and ii). 
In addition, countries are not required to include in Total AMS or reduce direct payments 
under production-limiting programs if the payments are based on fixed area and yields; or made 
on 85 percent or less of the base level of production; or are livestock payments based on a fixed 
number of head. Domestic support meeting these criteria is known as Blue Box support. Blue 
Box exemptions have been claimed mainly by the EU and the U.S., for whom this category was 
devised. However, in early 2001 Japan claimed Blue Box exemption for certain support to rice 
from 1998, referring to policy changes that also would allow it not to measure considerable 
amounts of support previously notified as market price support. 
More widely applicable are the exemptions for Green Box policies. Support measures in 
this category are considered to have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production. Measures for which exemption is claimed must meet the following basic criteria: a) 
the support is provided through a publicly-funded government program not involving transfers 
from consumers and b) the support does not have the effect of supporting producer prices. In 




following categories of government programs:  
1)  general services; 
2)  public stockholding for food security purposes; 
3)  domestic food aid; 
4)  direct payments to producers;  
5)  decoupled income support;  
6)  government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programs; 
7)  payments for relief from natural disasters; 
8)  structural adjustment assistance provided through i) producer retirement programs; ii) 
resource retirement programs; and iii) investment aids;  
9)  payments under environmental programs; 
10) payments under regional assistance programs.  
To ensure that policies that qualify under the Green Box are not subject to challenge by 
rules that apply to non-agricultural subsidies, the URAA provides for “Due Restraint” by 
countries in taking such action. The Peace Clause, as this provision is known, specifies that 
domestic support measures that fully conform to the Green Box provisions are non-actionable 
and are exempt from a variety of actions, including the imposition of countervailing duties.  
Other domestic support is also immune to certain actions in some circumstances.  The Peace 
Clause is scheduled to expire at the end of 2003.   
Developing countries can exempt a somewhat larger set of policy instruments from 
commitment and reduction. It was recognized that government assistance to encourage 
agricultural and rural development is an integral part of the development programs of developing 
countries. For developing countries, investment subsidies that are available to agriculture and 
agricultural input subsidies available to low-income or resource-poor producers are exempt from 
domestic support reduction. In addition, domestic support given to producers to encourage 
diversification away from illicit narcotic crops is exempt from domestic support reduction. These 
provisions are known collectively as Article 6.2 exemptions. 
II. Current Situation 
The close link between the rules relating to domestic support as defined by the WTO and 
the overall development of agricultural policy means that any discussion of the current levels of 




also highly concentrated in a few countries: the European Union, the United States and Japan 
account for 90 percent of total domestic support for the OECD area as a whole (OECD, 2001b). 
This section looks first at the extent to which these and some other countries have reduced their 
“trade-distorting” domestic support measures and then at some of the major developments in 
domestic policy in so far as they are in part a reaction to the constraints imposed by the Uruguay 
Round. 
1. AMS Levels 
In meeting their Total AMS commitment levels as agreed to in the URAA, members of 
the WTO were required to provide notification of agricultural support to the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture. Total AMS commitments and Current Totals (as notified to the WTO) are shown for 
selected countries in Table 1, for the years 1995 to 1999. The proportion of “allowable” AMS 
used by selected members is shown in Table 2. With a few exceptions, member countries have 
adjusted their domestic support policies in order to comply with the agreement. Of the Cairns 
Group countries
1 only South Africa (97%) and Thailand (79%) were close to the limit on support 
in 1997; Australia was at 25%, while Costa Rica and New Zealand were apparently providing no 
support at all through Amber Box policies. The corresponding figure for the European Union 
(average of 1995 - 1998) is 66%, for Japan (average of 1995 - 1998) it is 58.5%, and for the 
United States (average of 1995 - 1997) it is 27%. 
One way in which countries have been able to reduce their AMS levels to meet their 
URAA commitments is by shifting domestic support from non-exempt to exempt categories.  For 
example, over 60 percent of domestic support in OECD countries is excluded from reduction 
commitments (OECD, 2001b). The composition of domestic support by category is presented for 
selected countries in Table 3. The structure of support ranges from New Zealand with all of its 
support in the Green Box category to the European Union with less than 25% of its support in the 
Green Box. Table 3 also shows a consistent trend in shifting domestic support away from the 
non-exempt categories into the exempt Green and Blue Boxes. This trend can be illustrated by 
observing the developments in domestic policy over the period since the Uruguay Round. 
2. Policy Changes since URAA 
Over the period since the Uruguay Round there have also been a number of developments 
taking place with respect to the domestic agricultural policy of individual countries. Some of 
these developments are in response to the URAA while other changes were the result of internal 
factors. Most of these new developments have implications for the current negotiations. The 
following discussion reviews agricultural policy changes that have occurred in the United States, 
the European Union, and some Asian countries, as they relate to the issue of domestic support. 
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a. United States – FAIR Act 
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 was an attempt to 
continue the support of domestic farm income while at the same time reducing the role of the 
government in managing commodity markets. In that respect much of it was in line with the 
URAA. At the time there was hope that the FAIR Act would provide for a more market-oriented 
U.S. agricultural sector. The U.S. could in effect remove its main crop payments from the Blue 
Box.  
The FAIR Act was introduced at a time when agricultural prices were relatively high. 
However, depressed market prices combined with various natural disasters have resulted in 
dramatic increases in government expenditures in the form of marketing loans under the FAIR 
Act as well as emergency relief under additional authorities. This has raised the issue of the 
extent to which current and future US policies are “de-coupled” from output decisions. There are 
certain provisions of the FAIR Act that could influence planting decisions. If so, they may not be 
minimally production- and trade-distorting and would therefore not qualify for exempt status 
under Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (The Green Box). These provisions include i) 
production flexibility contracts; ii) crop and revenue insurance; and iii) disaster assistance 
programs. The challenge for policy makers in the next Round will be to determine clear criteria 
for categorizing these measures. 
b. European Union – Agenda 2000 
In March of 1999 the European Union completed negotiations to establish a new 
framework for its budgetary, regional and agricultural policies in light of the likely enlargement 
of the EU. The agricultural component of “Agenda 2000” was designed to create the conditions 
for EU agriculture to be competitive in world markets that are progressively characterized by 
lowered trade barriers. For the purpose of strengthening market orientation, Agenda 2000 
instituted reductions in market support prices for cereals, milk and milk products, and beef and 
veal. These reductions in support prices will be phased in gradually to provide enough time for 
producers to adjust to the new pricing conditions. At the same time, direct payments will be used 
to negate the impact of decreased producer prices, thereby providing income support for 
agricultural producers. This change in policy is consistent with the URAA agreement in that it 
will place less pressure on the AMS constraints and shift policies toward the Blue Box. 
Agenda 2000 also promotes the concept of multifunctionality. This notion holds that, 
because of the multifunctional nature of agriculture, agricultural support also provides benefits in 
non-agricultural areas, such as rural development and the environment. Thus in domestic terms, 
agricultural policy is increasingly used to provide spillover benefits in other areas. The challenge 
for policy makers in the WTO will be to determine clear criteria for categorizing production- and 
trade-distorting measures when the main purpose of these domestic policies is the provision of an 
externality. 




c. Asian Countries 
Since 1995, some Asian countries have initiated policies that seek to support and 
strengthen domestic agriculture. The set of policies in place before the UR, which were 
formulated in the 1960s, reflected concerns about conserving foreign exchange, fostering import 
substitution, maintaining rural employment, boosting rural household income, and preserving 
smallholder agriculture. The more recent policies are still concerned with rural income, but put a 
greater emphasis on letting markets work, rather than targeting certain commodity outcomes. 
Important examples are new policies in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. 
The completion of the UR in 1995 had a significant impact on agricultural policy in the 
region’s two wealthiest WTO members, Japan and Korea. Neither country welcomed the URAA, 
although they supported other agreements of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the 
WTO. To compensate farmers for the reduction in trade barriers and trade-distorting domestic 
support, both instituted massive spending plans for the sector. Japan announced an extra $60 
billion in spending to restructure agriculture, to be allocated over a 5-year period. South Korea 
announced 42 trillion won (about $54 billion at the 1995 exchange rate) to be spent on 
agricultural restructuring for its farm sector, also for a five-year period. It appears that the extra 
spending has actually occurred, indicating a significant shift in the direction of policy away from 
reliance on border measures.  
  The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Policy (July 1999) in Japan “thoroughly 
reviews the postwar agricultural policies…and sets up a new policy-making scheme under the 
new principles.” “The four basic principles” are securing a stable food supply; fulfillment of 
multi-functionality of agriculture; sustainable development of agriculture; and promotion of rural 
areas. Japan retains its huge rice diversion program (notified as a Green Box environmental 
payment), but has begun a new policy that uses direct payments to compensate farmers for drops 
in market prices. While rice support payments are claimed in the blue box (because of certain 
production-limiting provisions), similar direct payments for other commodities will presumably 
remain in the amber box. Direct payments, in contrast to the market price support they replace, 
do not affect consumer prices and thus should affect trade less. 
The Agricultural and Rural Basic Law (Jan. 2000) which was adopted in Korea is part of 
a shift away from farm assistance to more market-oriented policies intended to improve 
agricultural productivity. Its underlying objectives are food security; multi-functionality of 
agriculture; raising farmers’ incomes by means of direct payments rather than price support; 
improvement of rural life; cooperative production and marketing methods; and increasing value-
added processing of agricultural products. Despite this, government rice purchases, which affect 
market prices, continue to be a leading feature of agricultural policy, and ensure that Korea 
remains perilously close to exceeding its AMS commitment each year. 
Other Asian member-countries of the WTO (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Brunei, and Mongolia) 
have developing-country status.  Thailand, the Philippines, and India report amber-box policies, 
chiefly to support rice farmers (by government purchases that seek to raise prices and through 
concessionary loans).  Of the three, only Thailand reports policy support that exceeds de minimis 




countries to negotiations about a new multilateral agreement are evidence that these countries 
still regard government intervention in commodity markets, rather than direct payments to 
farmers, to be a useful policy tool. 
The newer programs in Japan and Korea, and to some extent in South and Southeast 
Asia, allow greater freedom for labor and capital movement in the rural sector. Few programs 
now explicitly target greater production of any particular commodity. Instead, in Japan and 
Korea, safety nets are provided on a commodity basis. If prices fall sharply or natural disasters 
occur, producers of a certain commodity are assured that the government will ensure a price floor 
or provide financial assistance. This raises the question regarding their consistency with the 
minimal production- and trade-distorting criteria to qualify as Green Box policies under the 
URAA. 
III. Problems and Issues 
1. Effectiveness of the Current Agreement 
If the URAA is judged purely on the basis of the level of support for agriculture it 
appears to have had limited impact. In fact, domestic support levels in the European Union and 
the United States were as high in the late nineties as those in the 1986-88 base period. Support 
for the agricultural sectors of the main developed countries returned to the high levels seen at the 
beginning of the Uruguay Round, although the year 2000 did see a modest decline in support in 
some of these countries (OECD, 2001a). There remain some key sectors, such as dairy and 
sugar, where adjustments to less production/trade distorting outcomes have yet to take place. In 
these areas, domestic producer/consumer price wedges with respect to international prices 
remain relatively large. 
The URAA scores somewhat better in terms of the nature of domestic support. The 
Agreement has reinforced the shift from non-exempt (Amber Box) to exempt (Green Box or 
Blue Box) domestic support, even if it has not ensured that total support is reduced. Countries 
have the latitude to provide a wide spectrum of domestic support under the provisions of the 
Green and Blue Box categories as well as under the de minimis provisions. The evaluation of the 
impact of the domestic support rules in the URAA must therefore rest on how effective this shift 
has been in reducing trade-distorting policies. 
A number of factors limit the effectiveness of the domestic support provisions of the 
URAA in this regard. 
•  Several countries have been able to meet their URAA obligations by shifting support to 
exempt (Blue and Green Box) policies. As a result, some countries have been able to meet 
their commitments without reducing their support. Some argue that this is a weakness of the 
current agreement, while others maintain that the shift from Amber Box to Green and Blue 
Box measures is evidence of its success. 




•  Many argue that Green Box policies, as determined using the current criteria, can themselves 
result in distortions. 
•  The commitment is on Total AMS, not on product-specific AMS amounts. This allows 
countries to reduce support for some products, while leaving support for other products 
untouched (or even raised from original levels). 
•  The de minimis provisions are applied on both a product-specific and sector-wide basis. 
Providing exemptions in this manner creates the potential for the continued support of 
commodity production at high levels. 
•  The market price support component of the AMS is based on the domestic administered 
support price and a fixed external reference price. The domestic administered support price 
may be a poor proxy for the internal market price while the fixed external reference price 
does not represent the actual border price. This brings into question the measures of price 
support as defined by the Agreement.  
•  Many countries believe that the Agreement does not provide specific criteria for determining 
a country’s development status. 
Despite these caveats it is notable that few countries have taken advantage of the 
mechanisms set up by the Uruguay Round to challenge the domestic policies of others. In part 
this reflects the “due restraint” that countries agreed to adopt, which through 2003 limits the 
extent to which both Green Box and other domestic support policies are actionable. But there 
have been no legal challenges to the classification that countries have used to place their policy 
measures in the various boxes
2. Either the system is working rather well or the rules are deemed 
to have inadequate teeth to make a challenge worthwhile. If most countries are well within their 
allowable Total AMS levels, it makes little sense to challenge particular Green Box policies to 
try to have them declared “Amber.” 
2. Issues for the Current Negotiations 
The perceived areas of ineffectiveness in the current Agreement can be used to identify 
areas for progress in the next agreement. These issues include the accommodation of “non-trade” 
concerns; reductions in the aggregate measurement of support (including definition and criteria 
for exempt policies; consideration of inflation and exchange rate changes; the role of de minimis 
provisions; and total versus product-specific AMS commitments); the role of the Blue Box; 
limits on Green Box subsidies; the role of the Peace Clause; and the role of special and 
differential treatment.  
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a. The Accommodation of Non-Trade Concerns  
One of the challenges for the next negotiations involves the identification of ways to 
reduce trade-distorting domestic support while providing countries with the flexibility to achieve 
important societal goals. The urgency of this issue will increase as the amount of support allowed 
within the Amber and Blue Boxes declines. Criteria must be refined to provide clearer 
definitions of acceptable minimal-trade-distorting domestic policy measures that allow countries 
to pursue important societal objectives, such as those in the areas of the environmental standards, 
rural development, food security and poverty alleviation.  
b. Further Reductions in AMS 
The URAA placed limits on individual countries’ Total AMS and reached agreement on 
reductions, resulting in a final, bound support level. An issue for the next Round will be how 
much further to reduce these levels, and whether to use as a base for reduction the bound support 
level or some other value.  The bound amount of AMS support varies greatly among countries, 
with most countries having a zero commitment and some countries having a much higher 
commitment than others, in relation to the size of their respective agricultural sectors. In 
addition, negotiators will have to consider the method of reductions. Should support be reduced 
by a certain amount or to a certain amount? Reducing support by a certain amount provides 
advantages to those countries with currently high levels of support. Reducing support to a certain 
amount would result in a more level playing field among countries. 
The current de minimis rules specify the levels of support for developed and developing 
countries that can escape commitment. Negotiators will likely consider whether exemptions 
under the de minimis provisions should be retained. If these provisions are kept, the next logical 
progression is to determine by how much or to what level the de minimis threshold will be 
reduced. On the other hand, some countries have proposed that developing countries be allowed 
to increase their exempt level provided under the de minimis provisions. 
AMS commitments and levels are reported in nominal terms. Because of this, high levels 
of inflation or fluctuations in the exchange rate will create distortions when evaluating support 
levels. Negotiators should consider the development of criteria that account for inflation or 
exchange rate fluctuations in determining a country’s AMS level. 
During the time since the URAA was reached, a number of countries have shifted 
significant portions of their domestic support from non-exempt categories into the Green and 
Blue Boxes, categories that are currently exempt from commitment. One issue related to this 
involves whether all domestic policies currently categorized as exempt truly fit the criteria of the 
current agreement. The next agreement may seek more specific policy criteria to determine the 
status of domestic support. Specifically, the issue of decoupled payments must be addressed and 
appropriate criteria developed.  
As the Agreement currently exists, countries have the flexibility to adjust the level of 




commitment. Setting AMS limits on a product-specific basis would increase the discipline of the 
Agreement. 
c. Role of the Blue Box 
Direct payments under certain production-limiting criteria are not used in AMS 
calculations and are currently exempt from commitment. These Blue Box exemptions are 
specified in Article 6.5 of the URAA. The reason for this provision was to make it easier for the 
EU and the U.S. to meet their respective reduction commitments. The EU used the Blue Box for 
its ongoing compensatory payments under the 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) while the U.S. used the Blue Box for its 1995 deficiency payments. Japan placed its rice 
policies into the Blue Box in 1998, replacing huge levels of rice support formerly subject to 
reduction in the Amber Box. Other countries utilizing this provision include Norway and, in the 
past, Iceland and the Slovak Republic. Some argue that the purpose of the Blue Box was 
transitional and should be phased out, thus encouraging countries to adopt measures that fit the 
Green Box criteria. Issues concerning the Blue Box involve whether it should be eliminated and 
at what rate. 
d. Limits on Green Box Subsidies 
The URAA placed no limits on the level of support or the total amount of expenditures 
that could be provided within the Green Box framework. In this category, domestic support that 
has no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production is exempt from 
reduction requirements. The two basic criteria for Green Box support are that the support must 
be government-funded (not involving transfers from consumers), and it must not have the effect 
of providing price support to producers. A number of policy-specific criteria and conditions also 
apply. However, the less-than-precise nature of the criteria has left room for interpretation 
concerning policies allowed within the Green Box. Beyond the clarification of accepted Green 
Box policies, several countries have called for limits in this category. While the question of 
limiting Green Box expenditures will be a contentious issue, an area of compromise could 
involve better definitions regarding which policies have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting 
effects or effects on production. 
e. The Role of the Peace Clause  
The peace clause provides incentive for countries to shift domestic policy instruments 
toward the Green Box category in order to eliminate the threat of countervailing duties and other 
actions. One question to ask concerning the future of the peace clause involves the form it should 
take to encourage the greatest shift toward qualifying support. Should it be of limited duration or 
permanent? Should it only cover Green Box policies or include other support? If the peace clause 
were allowed to expire would it eliminate much of the incentive to shift from non-qualifying to 
qualifying support categories? The outcome concerning the peace clause and its optimal form 




f. Special and Differential Treatment 
Developing countries have been afforded special and differential treatment under the 
URAA. These include a smaller commitment reduction requirement, a higher de minimis level, 
and a longer implementation period. The continuation of Special and Differential Treatment 
seems likely. In addition to determining the type of Special and Differential Treatment that will 
be granted, the next Round should develop specific criteria as to which members qualify as 
developing countries. The question has also been raised concerning the provision of Special and 
Differential Treatment to transition economies. 
IV. Members’ Positions on Domestic Support 
Most WTO members have by now presented their opinions on the way in which 
constraints on domestic support should be modified in the current trade negotiations. The main 
proposals are summarized in the Annex.  A general overview of the initial positions as based on 
the WTO position papers is presented in Table 4.  An indication of the level of support for 
various issues as indicated by these position papers is presented in Table 5. In this section these 
proposals are discussed using a simple framework indicated in Figure 1. Countries face the 
choice as to whether to categorize domestic support measures or not. Those that choose not to do 
so can still restrain the level of support. The issue then becomes one of deciding on the scope of 
the reduction and the level of cuts. For those that choose the path of categorizing support, the 
question arises as to how policies should be defined. The criteria for inclusion of policy 
instruments in the Green Box are perhaps the major issue for these countries. Once one has 
decided to classify policies the issue of appropriate reductions emerges. A wide range of views is 
apparent on how to discipline particular types of policy and indeed whether to impose any limits 
on Green and Blue Box measures. This framework is used in the following discussion of 
members’ proposals. 
1. Limits on All Domestic Support 
Several proposals indicate that support measures should not be categorized, but the total 
domestic support of industrial countries should be capped. The group consisting of Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri 
Lanka and El Salvador proposes that all domestic support categories be collapsed into one 
“General Subsidies” box. A common level of support should be allowed, which is non-
actionable. Subsidies of five percent above this level will be ‘actionable’ for developed 
countries. 
Egypt proposes that developed countries, which currently utilize extensive domestic 
support mechanisms, should agree to substantially reduce the levels of such support, and, for the 
purpose of clarity and transparency, grant support on a disaggregated product-by-product basis. 
Such reductions, with a substantial up-front down payment, should be made across the color 
gamut of boxes.  




Under India’s proposal, direct payments along with decoupled income support and 
governmental financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programs as 
well as direct payments under production limiting programs should be included in the non-
product-specific AMS.  They should also be subject to a reduction commitment so as not to 
exceed the de minimis level, i.e., five percent (for developed countries) and ten percent (for 
developing countries) of the value of the member’s total agricultural production. 
Canada offered proposals in addition to those submitted by the Cairns Group. Under the 
Canadian proposal the agricultural negotiations would pursue and develop an overall limit on the 
amount of support of all types (Green, Blue and Amber) provided to agriculture, to ensure that 
the reform program reduces inequities.  
2. Amber Box Issues 
a. Reductions and Modifications 
Several proposals call for the reduction and elimination of the Amber Box policies 
included in the Aggregate Measurement of Support. Under the ASEAN proposal the AMS would 
be subject to reduction, leading to elimination. The Cairns Group calls for a formula based 
approach that will be used to reduce trade and production distorting domestic support, including 
the AMS, leading to the elimination of such support and thus the removal of disparities in the 
levels of this support provided by countries. 
Morocco targets the AMS of developed countries. Its plan calls for a reduction of 10 
percent of the amounts effectively granted during the first year; a further annual reduction during 
the implementation period with a view to the final elimination of the subsidies; and a 50 percent 
reduction, if not the complete elimination, of the de minimis threshold. 
Under the European Union proposal the reform process should be pursued through 1) 
further reduction in the Total AMS starting from the final bound commitment level; 2) further 
strengthening of the rules concerning non-product specific domestic support; and 3) reduction of 
the de minimis level for developed countries. Japan proposes that the base level of the Total 
AMS should be equivalent to the final commitment level in the year 2000 (ceiling) in order to 
secure the continuity of agricultural policy reform. These views are similar to the position of 
Poland, which voices its willingness to undertake negotiations for further reduction of bound 
levels of the AMS, specified in the schedules according to the UR formula. The European Union 
also proposes that the Amber Box be modified to allow specific discipline to be applied to 
variable subsidies that boost export performance through providing compensation for variations 
in market prices. 
Mexico’s position is that the reduction in the AMS should be as substantial as possible. 
Given that it is the Amber Box domestic support measures that most distort production and trade, 
reductions should considerably exceed those applied during the Uruguay Round. These 
reductions should be greater in the developed countries, where such instruments are used more 




Norway proposes that, based on existing bound commitments, the AMS would be divided 
into domestic support to agricultural production destined for the domestic market and support to 
export-oriented production. Export-oriented production support would be subject to further 
reductions. 
The United States calls for the establishment of a “non-exempt support category” that 
would be subject to a reduction commitment. Members with a final bound AMS in their 
schedules would commit to reduce the level of non-exempt support. These reductions would start 
from the final bound AMS under the URAA and be reduced to a final bound level equal to a 
fixed percentage of the members’ value of total agricultural production in a fixed base period. 
However, according to Japan, it is unreasonable to set the level of AMS as a fixed percentage of 
each Member’s total agricultural production.  
India proposes that a suitable methodology of notifying the domestic support in a stable 
currency/basket of currencies be adopted for taking into account the incidence of inflation and 
exchange rate variations. In a similar proposal, Norway recommends that monetary domestic 
support commitments should be subject to annual inflation adjustments. 
The ASEAN countries propose that reduction commitments within the Amber Box be 
made on a disaggregated level. India and Jordan support the notion that negative product-specific 
support should be allowed to be counted against positive non-product-specific AMS support. 
While product-specific support should be calculated at the agriculture-wide level, support to any 
one particular commodity should not be allowed to exceed the double of the de minimis limit of 
that commodity.  
b. Developing Countries and the AMS 
A number of countries support “Special and Differential Treatment,” particularly for 
developing countries. According to the ASEAN proposal, developed countries should no longer 
be allowed to have the additional flexibility to apply de minimis. Kenya proposes that all trade-
distorting subsidies utilized by developed countries should be completely eliminated. Developing 
countries should not be expected to undertake any further liberalization commitments until this is 
accomplished. The Congo calls for an improvement of the Amber Box, raising the possibility for 
the least-developed countries to go beyond their base level AMS. 
The Cairns Group supports the use of a differentiated AMS formula and commitments for 
developing countries, while Morocco calls for a rise in the AMS level or at least no commitment 
to reducing the AMS for the developing countries. To ensure equity and a balance of obligations, 
Nigeria would allow developing countries to take new measures, for instance in the area of 
domestic support, up to levels substantially higher than the de minimis levels. According to the 
Transition Economies this concept should be extended, by increasing the de minimis threshold 
applicable to the transition economies. Mexico’s proposal calls for the provisions on special and 
differential treatment for developing countries with respect to domestic support being maintained 
and improved; at the same time these measures should be exempt from countervailing measures. 




The Indian proposal would have total domestic support brought down below the de 
minimis level within a maximum period of three years by developed countries and in five years 
by the developing country Members. According to the Indian proposal, developed countries 
should make a down payment by the end of the year 2001 of 1) a 50 percent reduction in the 
domestic support from the level maintained during the year 2000; or 2) non-product-specific 
support provided in favour of agricultural producers in general the amount exceeding the de 
minimis level, whichever is lower. In addition, product-specific support provided to low-income, 
resource-poor farmers in developing countries should be excluded from the AMS calculations, as 
is the case for the non-product-specific support. 
3. Blue Box Issues 
A few countries want the Blue Box to be treated as a modified, constrained Amber Box 
and eventually eliminated. ASEAN is clear that the Blue Box support must be subjected to 
substantial reduction commitments leading to its elimination. The Cairns Group support of a 
formula to reduce the AMS holds for the Blue Box as well. Mexico’s position is that, contrary to 
what was agreed in the Uruguay Round, the amounts allocated to Blue Box programs should be 
reduced at an accelerated pace. Jordan suggests that domestic support under production limiting 
programs, which are exempt from the reduction commitment, could be maintained since this can 
be useful in converting trade-distorting support to less trade-distorting support; however, it 
should be subject to reduction commitments leading to their elimination. The proposed U.S. 
categorization of support as exempt and non-exempt would likely place current Blue Box 
support in the non-exempt category. 
A number of countries are quite firm in stating that Blue Box policies should be exempt 
from reduction. Both the European Union and Japan state that the concept of the Blue Box must 
be maintained. From the Korean perspective, the Blue Box should be maintained since it can be 
useful in converting trade-distorting support to less trade-distorting support. Norway also wants 
the Blue Box maintained. Poland proposes to assure the right of every Member to introduce and 
maintain Blue Box payments. At the other end of the spectrum, Morocco’s proposal calls for the 
elimination, over a period of five years, of Blue Box subsidies. 
4. Green Box Issues 
Most countries support the continuation of Green Box measures within the framework of 
Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Mexico’s position is that the Green Box and its 
exemptions should be maintained. While the U.S. does not mention the Green Box, per se, 
policies in its proposed “exempt support category” would have no, or at most, minimal trade 
distorting effects or effects on production and would be exempt from reduction commitments. 
Many countries and groups would like the definition as to what constitutes Green Box 
policies to be clarified. According to the Cairns Group proposal, basic and policy-specific 
criteria for Green Box support not subject to reduction and elimination should be reviewed to 
ensure that all such domestic support meets the fundamental requirements of no, or at most 




have at most minimal or no trade-distorting or production effects. In order to minimize any 
possible trade-distorting effects of Green Box measures, Turkey proposes the introduction of 
clear definitions and sets of rules. Egypt would like measures allowed under Annex 2 to be 
reviewed for their compatibility with non-trade distortion. Jordan would also like the Green Box 
maintained, and states that criteria should be reviewed to ensure that all such domestic support 
meets the fundamental requirements of no or at most minimal trade-distorting effects or effects 
on production. Morocco is more direct in stating that Green Box measures must be redefined to 
eliminate measures that create trade distortions.  
Korea, Japan, and the European Union are concerned with multifunctionality and its 
compatibility with the Green Box. According to Korea, the scope and criteria of Green Box 
should be adjusted to be more flexible so that the multifunctionality of agriculture can be 
properly reflected. The following measures should also be exempt from reduction commitment:  
a.  Compensatory Supports for Multifunctionality of Agriculture;  
b.  Supports for Enhancing Income Safety Net;  
c.  Supports for Small-scale Family Farm Households;  
d.  Supports for Agricultural and Rural Development in Developing Countries.  
The European Union proposes that criteria to be met by measures that fall into the Green 
Box be revisited to ensure minimal trade distortion whilst at the same time ensuring appropriate 
coverage of measures that meet important societal goals. In addition, the EU proposes that 
measures aimed at protecting the environment, sustainable vitality of rural areas and poverty 
alleviation should be accommodated in the Agreement on Agriculture. Such measures should be 
well targeted, transparent, and implemented in no more than minimally trade-distorting ways. 
According to Japan, the requirements for decoupled income support should be improved, 
in order to reflect the real situation of production. In view of introducing safety-net programs it is 
appropriate to ease the requirements on measures, such as income insurance and income 
safety-net programs, as well as the restriction on the rate of compensation concerning those 
measures. 
A few countries call for bounds with respect to the amount of support provided in the 
Green Box. ASEAN calls for an overall cap on the budget of developed countries allocated for 
Green Box measures. Morocco would like upper limits imposed for these measures when they 
have a negative impact.  
India proposes that direct payments to producers, decoupled income support, and 
government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programs in 
developed countries should not be exempt from reductions, but should be considered non-
product-specific policies in the Amber Box.  




From the perspective of Switzerland, since the Green Box can contain only measures that 
have little or no impact on production and trade, an absolute multilateral ceiling must be 
excluded. 
5. Peace Clause Issues and Non-Countervailability 
According to the group consisting of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador, the Due Restraint 
Clause protecting Green Box subsidies from certain trade remedy action should be terminated as 
soon as possible. Egypt calls for an urgent review of the ‘Due Restraint’ provisions, as their use 
constitutes an additional window for some members to unfairly support their agricultural sectors. 
Kenya’s position is that the Peace Clause should not be extended beyond 2003. However, 
domestic support measures provided by developing countries within the framework of Food 
Security/Development Box and those under Article 6.2 should be made totally non-actionable.  
Canada proposes that support meeting Annex 2 (Green Box) criteria should be 
permanently recognized as not countervailable. According to India, after the abolition of the 
peace clause (Article 13), as a special and differential provision for developing countries, 
measures under Annex 2 and other domestic support measures conforming to Article 6 (Blue 
Box) shall be exempt from imposition of countervailing duties and shall also be exempt from 
actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions. 
6. Development Box Issues 
Nearly all proposals are supportive of provisions to aid developing countries. The Cairns 
Group supports enhanced Green Box provisions for developing countries. At the same time they 
advocate enhanced technical assistance and promotion of international cooperation to assist 
agricultural and rural development, and food security programs in developing countries. This is 
similar to the position of the European Union, in which the EU proposes that measures to 
promote the sustainable vitality of rural areas and the food security concerns of developing 
countries as a means of poverty alleviation, where appropriate, be exempted from any reduction 
commitments. The EU also proposes that other ways be examined to provide the necessary 
flexibility for countries to address development concerns, notably through a revision of the de 
minimis clause for developing countries. 
Kenya states that a Development Box should be designed with a view to consolidating, 
strengthening and operationalizing the special and differential treatment for developing 
countries. In the same vein, Nigeria calls for negotiators to ensure that all/any measures aimed at 
enhancing domestic production are exempt from reduction commitments, recognizing the need 
for 1) flexibility for developing countries in domestic support measures to address the concerns 
of the rural population for the sustenance of their livelihood and employment; and 2) attainment 
of a certain degree of food self sufficiency. India sums up this perspective when it states that all 




employment and diversification of agriculture should be exempted from any reduction 
commitments. 
Jordan’s proposal calls for the exemption of all measures taken by developing countries 
for poverty alleviation, rural development, rural employment, desert reclamation and 
diversification of agriculture from any reduction commitments. Direct or indirect measures that 
are an integral part of the development programs of developing countries, including investment 
and input subsidies, as identified in Article 6.2 of the present Agreement, must remain exempt 
from reduction commitments during the next phase of the reform program. Similarly, the Congo 
supports a development box that allows for all financial undertakings and efforts of 
least-developed countries. However, consideration should be given not only to a country’s level 
of economic development and geographical situation but also to cases of force majeure (war, 
natural disasters) for the implementation of rules and commitments. 
The position of Senegal is that developing countries be allowed the full possibility of 
giving internal support to the agricultural sector with a view to ensuring food security, preserving 
jobs in rural areas and reducing poverty; and to introduce flexible measures in their favor for this 
purpose. Developing countries with low agricultural production should be given flexibility in all 
instruments relating to agricultural production. This would enable them to undertake reforms 
necessary for maintaining their level of food production in the short term and significantly 
improving agricultural productivity in the long term. Senegal envisages replacing criteria in the 
form of deadlines, which are often fixed arbitrarily, with objectively verifiable economic 
indicators, based in particular on the level of development or growth of the sector. Provision for 
revising the deadlines granted to developing countries should be made, in particular as regards 
the granting of marketing subsidies provided for under Articles 9.4 and 9.1(d) and (e) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  
The United States calls for the creation of additional criteria for exempt support measures 
deemed essential to the development and food security objectives of developing countries.  
These objectives include facilitating the development of targeted programs to increase 
investment and improve infrastructure; enhancing domestic marketing systems; helping farmers 
manage risk; providing access to new technologies that promote sustainability and resource 
conservation; and increasing productivity of subsistence producers. 
From the ASEAN group perspective, measures that are an integral part of the 
development, diversification, and food security programs of developing countries must remain 
exempt from reduction commitments during the next phase of the reform program. Turkey 
echoes this sentiment when it states that domestic support in developed countries over the de 
minimis level should be reduced substantially or be eliminated, while the de minimis level for 
developing countries should be increased to a mutually agreed level. Developing countries 
should be granted the flexibility to apply de minimis on an aggregate basis, instead of a product 
basis, taking into consideration the changing production conditions. Special and Differential 
Treatment granted for developing countries should be continued to be exempted from reduction 
commitments. 




Egypt supports the concept of granting greater flexibility to developing country members 
to increase their levels of domestic support within the framework of Green Box (Annex 2) 
measures. Korea’s proposal states that, given the different developmental stages and conditions 
across Member countries, each Member country should be able to implement agricultural 
policies that fit its domestic situation. This argument is extended by Morocco, calling for new 
provisions to be introduced in the Special and Differential Treatment category that account for 
the particular conditions prevailing in developing countries. 
Norway quite simply states that special attention must be paid to the needs of developing 
countries in the area of domestic support. From the perspective of the group consisting of Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri 
Lanka and El Salvador, flexibility should be provided to developing countries in the form of a 
‘Development’ box. 
While the majority of countries emphasize the needs of developing countries, one group 
that is often ignored in this “Development” box discussion is the Transition Economies. The 
Transition Economies, consisting of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, call 
for the use of exempt investment subsidies and input subsidies for the transition economies 
V. Analysis of Options 
The varying country positions set forward to this point highlight the need for more 
analytical work to aid in the identification of non-trade-distorting solutions. While questions 
pertaining to the quantity of support allowable and pace of reductions may be political in nature, 
identifying those disciplines on domestic support that minimize international market distortions 
is a task for economists. This section will focus on two general areas of analytical uncertainty: 
the significance of multifunctionality for the discipline on domestic support and the correct 
specification of Green, Blue and Amber Box criteria. 
1. Multifunctionality and Trade Distortions 
The European Union, Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland argue that the 
multifunctional role of agriculture should be accepted and Japan in particular suggests that 
Amber Box policies may be required to achieve the objective of obtaining the positive spill-overs 
from the agricultural sector. In their Note on Non-Trade Concerns a group of 27 countries, 
including the five listed above, recognizes that countries have the right to address non-trade 
concerns. Those listed include strengthening the socio-economic viability and development of 
rural areas, food security and environmental protection, and promoting the co-existence of 
various types of agriculture. The countries involved are supportive of providing flexibility to 
allow countries to pursue non-trade concerns. However, it is important to note that this statement 
calls for policies “which should be no more than minimally trade distorting” (WTO, 
G/AG/NG/W/36/Rev.1, 2000). 




Given this sentiment, the question remains as to why special flexibility should be 
provided for policies designed to achieve non-trade concerns if they would meet, or come close 
to meeting, minimal trade distorting criteria. Several position statements, including that of the 
Cairns Group, concede that countries have a right to pursue whatever agricultural policy 
objectives they wish. However, they argue that the instruments chosen should not distort 
international markets by introducing by-product distortions.  
There is a clear conflict on this issue between the Cairns Group and the United States on 
the one hand and the supporters of multifunctionality on the other. Whether the results of the 
economic analysis of joint products and externalities will ultimately convince the latter group of 
the unnecessary by-product distortions that their adherence to Amber Box policies would create, 
is an open question. But the more interesting issue is whether one can in fact categorize 
corrective domestic policies by looking at their output and trade effect. If economic analysis is to 
have any relevance in the negotiations, then it must have a good claim on this issue.  
The issue of multifunctionality raises a key question with regard to how discipline should 
be placed on domestic support. Categorization in the past has been based, to a large extent, on a 
policy’s presumed output distorting effects. While economic theory indicates that price-based 
domestic support has the greatest likelihood for output distortions, it is not necessarily the case 
that output-increasing policies are actually distorting. An efficient domestic policy in an 
importing country to provide a positive externality (or correct for a negative externality) could 
increase (or decrease) output. Exporting countries might well claim that their market is being 
reduced but it is not clear that this constitutes a trade distortion. Thus if countries choose to 
encourage the production of public goods which incidentally lead to more private good output it 
is not clear that economic logic can come to the rescue of the complaining exporter. The 
exporter’s case is stronger on political economy grounds, that the public good is a “cover” for the 
true objective of the policy which is to protect the incomes of the domestic producer. Thus the 
“multifunctionality” debate has much in common with those over product attributes (health and 
safety regulations) that are in danger of capture by protectionist interests. The question is not so 
much whether a trade effect is evidence of an inefficient domestic policy but rather whether 
allowing certain policy instruments to be used significantly increases the risk of capture by rent-
seeking domestic interests. 
If output effects are the main focus, rather than the efficiency of achieving domestic 
objectives, perhaps one can simplify the categorization of domestic support. Can one adopt an 
explicit categorization of policies based on output effects? Instead of the current Green, Blue, 
and Amber Box delineations, policies could be categorized as output-reducing, output-neutral or 
output-increasing. Policies in the output-reducing and output-neutral boxes would be deemed to 
be consistent with criteria of no trade effects or effects on production (even if they were actually 
inefficient in terms of their objectives). The policies in the output-increasing box would have to 
be specifically justified, in effect determining on a case by case basis which are deemed to be 
efficient and which protectionist. Just as the SPS Agreement introduces the “science” test for the 
legitimacy of restrictive health and safety regulations, so the Green Box could insist on 
“efficiency assessment” and countries could be held to a “least trade distorting” standard for 




science would increase the pressure on a Dispute Settlement Body that is already considered by 
some to be overloaded.  
Categorization of policies in this manner would serve to encourage countries that seek to 
achieve multifunctional criteria to do so through efficient means. In general, policies classified in 
the Green Box that are designed to address an externality, such as an environmental concern, 
would have to achieve this goal with a minimum of market distortion. Policies classified in the 
Amber Box can also achieve a desired outcome, but would have to do so without an excessive 
level of market distortion. The onus for countries using Blue Box policies would be to show that 
they had no output effect, and other countries could of course challenge this. 
2. Green Box Criteria 
  The issue of multifunctionality is only one aspect of the broader issue on which economic 
analysis can be brought to bear. Another is that of the nature of "de-coupling" and hence the 
criteria for Green Box instruments. In discussing weaknesses of the current agreement, Roberts, 
Podbury and Hinchy (2001) cite the cases of the U.S., EU, and Japan shifting potentially trade-
distorting support into exempt areas. They go on to list conditions that lead to reductions in 
market distortions, one of which is that measures that are exempted from agreed reductions are in 
fact minimally market distorting. Brink (2000) raises the issue that the criteria are so broad they 
permit trade-distorting policies to escape discipline, yet so narrow they rule out certain non-
trade-distorting policies. In addition, he considers the phrase "at most minimal trade-distorting 
effects or effects on production" open to interpretation. It is argued in the proposals of the Cairns 
Group, ASEAN and Canada that the basic and policy-specific criteria should be reviewed to 
ensure that instruments which are claimed by Members to fall into this box are truly minimally 
production distorting. However, in neither proposal is it spelled out exactly which elements of 
Annex 2 of the URAA are causing concern. 
In the list of policy-specific criteria, there are clearly some which are unlikely to be 
minimally trade distorting, if it is believed that, in general, farmers are risk averse. These include 
the specific provisions listed in Annex 2, especially in paragraph 2 (General services), paragraph 
5 (Direct payments to producers), paragraph 6 (Decoupled income support), paragraph 7 
(Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programs), 
paragraph 8 (Payments for relief of natural disasters) and paragraph 12 (Payments under 
environmental programs). By providing payments which, in effect, amount to increasing the 
producer’s wealth (paragraphs 2, 5, and 6) or which induce moral hazard (paragraphs 7, 8 and 
12), governments are affecting domestic production and hence international trade. Therefore, as 
a first step in negotiating a revision of the Green Box, these policy-specific criteria ought to be 
reviewed along with the basic criteria.  
In analyzing the criteria for the various boxes, it is imperative that the concept of 
“decoupled” support be clearly defined. What is decoupled from what? Several different 
possibilities exist. One variant is that of a payment to a farmer that is not dependent on the price 
of the product that the farmer sells. The presumption is that this will not influence the farmer’s 
output (planting or harvest) decision at the margin, if the farmer is risk neutral. One could call 




(expected) price. But another variant is that a payment be made unrelated to current output. An 
“output-decoupled” payment appears to be a stronger condition, as it implies that yield and 
acreage links should also be severed from payments. A third variant tries to break the link 
between farm payments and some aggregate level indicator, such as farm receipts or even world 
prices. The individual farm gets the same payment regardless of its current output or the price 
received for its crop, though there may be some statistical correlation. Individual behavior may 
not change to induce the payment but collectively the industry is “rescued” and thus aggregate 
output could respond. The notion of “macro-decoupling” payments from any indicator of the 
health of the farming sector is problematic and the degree of monitoring and evaluation that 
would be necessary would be formidable. But this is the concept that seems to be behind many 
proposals for revising Green Box definitions. 
None of these definitions however imply that there is no output effect from a payment. 
Each is vulnerable to the charge that there is a wealth effect, regardless of whether the payment 
is untied from current price or output or from the health of the farm sector. But to try to impose 
rules that would counter the trade effects of changes in wealth would be to risk bringing ridicule 
on the WTO. More problematic is the possibility that expectations of future prices can effect 
current output and that expectations of future payments can induce farmers to grow particular 
crops. Thus the challenge for economists is to better understand the relationship between policy 
instruments and expectations. The corresponding challenge for trade diplomats and lawyers is to 
figure out how to write rules that allow a government to take an action which may be output 
increasing in one context and output neutral under different circumstances. 
V. Conclusions 
Since the conclusion of the URAA, many countries have shifted domestic support away 
from the trade-distorting Amber Box toward the less distorting Blue and Green Boxes. This can 
be seen in Table 3 in this paper. While some of this shift may be attributed to the URAA, several 
concerns have arisen regarding the criteria used to classify domestic policies as having minimal 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production. Evaluating the successes of the current 
agreement relative to its inadequacies provides useful insights for developing the next 
agreement. 
The next Round will deal with several critical questions. Among these are concerns as to 
the structure to be adopted for the discipline categories; the type of development box to be 
established and whether a transition box should be established; whether AMS commitments 
should be on a product or sector-wide level; how the issue of multifunctional policies should be 
dealt with; whether allowable protection should be adjusted for inflation or exchange rate 
changes; and whether the use of de minimis should continue and if so, at what level. If the 
ultimate objective is to achieve freer trade, the next agreement must create an incentive structure 
that encourages countries to discontinue the use of trade-distorting domestic support policies. 
The first insight that can be gleaned from the current Agreement is that a self-enforcing 
framework can be established that encourages countries to adopt less trade-distorting domestic 




from countervailing duties and other retaliatory actions. This existence of exempt and non-
exempt Boxes combined with a Peace Clause of limited duration created an incentive for 
domestic support reform in many counties. Negotiators and policy-analysts should consider this 
as they structure the next agreement. 
The second insight to be gained from the current Agreement involves the need for well-
defined criteria. Specific definitions must be developed that clearly detail which domestic 
support policies should be categorized in which domestic support Box. This will be necessary 
regardless of the classification structure, be it Green, Blue, and Amber Boxes or simply exempt 
and non-exempt. 
Clarification of the criteria is a theme that permeates the various country proposals. For 
example, a number of countries wish to revisit and clarify the Green Box criteria. As additional 
concerns are addressed or exemptions provided, specific criteria must be developed regarding 
allowable policies or eligible countries. In the current Round of negotiations a number of 
potential situations exist where this will be important. For example, in the creation of a 
development box, what types of policies are eligible? In addition, what criteria must a country 
meet to be eligible? Questions of this type must be answered and appropriate criteria developed 
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Table 1:  Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) Commitments by Member, 1995-99 
    1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 





























Argentina  US million $  85.38  122.8  84.14  84.14  83.08    81.93    80.78   
Australia  $A million  570.16  151.72  550.5  144.19  530.84  131.62  511.18  119.71  491.52   
Brazil  US$ million  103.91  295.03  102.50  363.28  1,010.90  306.84  996.79    982.67   
Canada  Can$ million  5197  777  5017  618.7  4838    4659    4480   
Colombia  US$ '000  392465  58109  387165  3961  381858  14393  376555    371251   
Costa Rica  US$ '000  18153  0  17908  0  17663  0  17417    17172   
Cyprus  £C million  57.6  36.5  56.8  35.5  56.1  25.5  55.3  21.8  54.5   
Czech 
Republic 
K￿ million  16446.97  1152.49  15879.84  1688.74  15312.71  1053.86  14745.58  1012.98  14178.45   
EC  ECU billion  78.67  50.03  76.37  51  74.07  50.19  71.76  46.68  69.46   
Hungary  Ft million  40851  20949  39443    38034    36625    35217   
Iceland  SDR million  157.2  123.69  151.8  108.1  146.4  108.6  140.9  250.3  135.5   




Japan  ¥ billion  4800.6  3507.5  4635  3329.7  4469.5  3170.8  4304  766.5  4138.4   
Korea  W billion  2182.55  2075.44  2105.6  1967.36  2028.65  1936.95  1951.70  1562.77  1874.75   
Mexico  Mex$million (91)  28622.3  1364.66  28237.8    27853.2    27468.6    27084   
Morocco  DH million  779  94  769  250  758  91  748    737   
New Zealand  NZ$ million  348.30  0  336.29  0  324.28  0  312.27  0  300.26   
Norway  NOK million  13834  9786  13357  10529  12880  10526  12403  10886  11926   
Poland  US$ million  4022  254.5  3883  226.5  3745  295.8  3606  300.6  3457   
Slovak 
Republic 
Sk million  12252.5  7110.5  11830  6981.8  11407.5  8290.4  10985  7710  10562.5   
Slovenia  ECU '000  74730.18  69921.08  72153.28  69239.13  69576.38  69086.07  66999.48  65990.79  64422.58   
South Africa  R million  2435.3  1640.33  2351.3  1938.2  2267.4  2198.3  2183.4    2099.4   
Switz.-Liech.  Sw F million  5143  4286.6  4966  3663.1  4789  3445.1  4611  3273  4434   
Thailand  B million  21816.41  15773.25  21506.64  12932.47  21196.87  16756.58  20887.10  16402.10  20577.33   
United States  US$ million  23083.14  6213.86  22287.17  5897.66  21491.2  6238.4  20695.2    19899.3   
Venezuela  US$ '000  1287221 541784.05  1269826  331261  1252431  456549  1235036    1217642   




Table 2: Use of Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) Commitments by Member, 
1995-98 (Percentage) 
Member  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Argentina  144  100     
Australia  27  26  25  23 
Brazil  28  35  30   
Canada  15  12     
Colombia  15  1  4   
Costa Rica  0  0  0   
Cyprus  63  62  45  39 
Czech Republic  7  11  7  7 
EC  64  67  68  65 
Hungary  51       
Iceland  79  71  74  178 
Israel  72  79  83   
Japan  73  72  71  18 
Korea  95  91  95  80 
Mexico  5       
Morocco  12  32  12   
New Zealand  0  0  0  0 
Norway  71  79  82  88 
Poland  6  6  8  8 
Slovak Republic  58  59  73  70 
Slovenia  94  96  99  98 
South Africa  67  82  97   
Switz-Liech.  83  74  72  71 
Thailand  72  60  79  78 
Tunisia  87  77  81  94 
United States  27  26  29   
Venezuela  42  26  36   
Notes:  The figures in this table represent notified Current Total AMS as a percentage of the 
Total AMS commitment levels for the respective implementation years. 




Table 3:  Domestic Support by Category, 1995-97 (Percentage) 
Country  ----------Green Box----------  ----------Blue Box----------  ---------Amber Box---------  ---Special & Differential---
  Base  1995  1996  1997  Base  1995  1996  1997  Base  1995  1996  1997  Base  1995  1996  1997 
Australia  60.85  85.99  90.35  91.18  0  0  0  0  39.15  13.45  9.65  8.82  0  0  0  0 
Brazil  73.36  88.19  80.46  85.47  0  0  0  0  18.05  2.33  11.23  7.58  8.6  6.48  8.31  6.95 
Canada  22.9  50.77  53.12    0  0  0    77.1  49.23  46.88    0  0  0  0 
EC  11.14  20.81  23.27  18.17  0  23.1  22.62  20.44  88.86  56.08  54.11  50.19  0  0  0   
Japan  30.78  47.2  45.56  45.23  0  0  0  0  69.23  52.8  54.38  54.77  0  0  0  0 
Korea  42.74  62.66  68.89  68.89  0  0  0  0  56.96  37.02  30.7  30.66  0.3  0.32  0.41  0.45 
Mexico  0  60.14      0  0      100  16.05      0  23.82     
New Zealand  25.5  100  100  100  0  0  0  0  74.5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
United States  48.62  75.77  88.02  87.92  0  11.57  0  0  51.38  12.67  11.98  12.08  0  0  0  0 
 
Source:  World Trade Organization (2000) G/AG/NG/S/1 and World Trade Organization (2000) G/AG/NG/S/1/Corr.1. 
Notes:  Green Box (DS:1) signifies measures which members have placed in the Green Box of measures exempt from reduction. 
Special & Differential (DS:2) signifies those measures that, for developing countries, are exempt from reduction commitments. 
Blue Box (DS:3) signifies direct payments under production-limiting programs.  
Amber Box (DS:4+) signifies measures that do not fit into the exempt categories as set out above. 




Table 4: Initial Positions as Reflected in WTO Position Papers. 
Country  ---------Green Box--------- ----------Blue Box----------  ----------Amber Box----------  ---Development Box--- 




Maintain  Cap and 
Reduce 
Eliminate  AMS 
Reduced 
Eliminate  Disaggregate 
Commitments 





    X    X    X      X  X 





  X    X  X  X  X    X  X 
Canada  X                     
The Congo      X              X  X 
Croatia 
 
                  X (c)  
 
X 
Cuba, et al.                    X   





  X        X      X  X 
India    X      X    X      X  X 
Japan      X  X      X         
Jordan      X  X  X        X  X   




Country  ---------Green Box-------------------Blue Box---------- ----------Amber Box----------  ---Development Box--- 




Maintain  Cap and 
Reduce 
Eliminate  AMS 
Reduced 
Eliminate  Disaggregate 
Commitments 
Yes  Separate 
Developing Country 
de minimis 
Korea        X               
Mexico  X        X    X      X   
Morocco    X  X    X  X  X (a)      X   
Norway  X      X      X (b)      X   
Namibia    X      X  X  X  X  X    X 
Nigeria                    X  X 
Poland        X      X         
Senegal                    X   
Switzerland  X                     
Transition 
Economies 
                  X(c)  X 
Turkey  X    X        X      X  X 
United  
States 
X          X  X      X   
  Cuba, et al. suggested consolidation of all subsidies into one box. 




Table 5: Level of Support for Various Issues as Indicated in WTO Position Papers. 




     No Cap  8 
     Cap and Reduce  5 




     Maintain  5 
     Cap and Reduce  9 




     AMS Reduced  14 
     Eliminate  4 
     Disaggregate Commitments  4 
 






     Should Exist  18 
     Developing Country de minimis 
 
11 













POSITIONS AND PROPOSALS 
 
OF SELECTED COUNTRIES/GROUPS 
 
          
 
   
African 
Group 
The basic and policy-
specific criteria for 
“green box” support 
should be tightened 
to ensure no, or at 
most, minimal, 
distorting effects on 
trade and production. 




particular small island 
and land-locked 
developing countries 
and LDCs, face 
budgetary constraints 
and therefore require 
stable and 
predictable conditions 
of preferential market 
access to be able to 
make use of Annex II 
measures. 
  The Agreement on 
Agriculture should be 
reviewed so as to: (a) 
increase flexibility in 
the use by 
developing countries 
of the de minimis 
measures; (b) allow 
developing countries 
with zero AMS to 
provide such support 
if required under their 
development 
programs; and (c) 
provide that input and 
investment subsidies 
available to low-
income farmers and 
to resource-poor 
farmers will be non-
actionable. 
The expansion of the 
scope of S&D 
treatment in the area 
of domestic support 
should allow 
developing countries 
to employ policy 
measures which 





security, as well as 
product 
diversification.  Such 
elements should take 
into account the need 
to strengthen 
vulnerable producers 
and to improve their 
export 
competitiveness.  
Trade and production 
distorting domestic 





during the course of 
the reform program.          
 






Green box measures  
must have at least 




Overall cap on the 
budget of developed 
countries allocated 
for Green Box 
measures. 
Blue box support 
must be subjected to 
substantial reduction 
commitments leading 
to their elimination.  
AMS subject to 





on a disaggregated 
level. 
Measures that are an 






must remain exempt 
from reduction 
commitments during 
the next phase of the 
reform program. 
Developed countries 
should no longer be 
allowed to have the 
additional flexibility to 
apply de-minimis.            
 







specific criteria for 
green box support 
not subject to 
reduction and 
elimination will be 
reviewed to ensure 
that all such domestic 
support meets the 
fundamental 
requirements of no, 
or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting or 
production effects.  
Formula approach will be used to deliver 
major reductions in trade and production 
distorting domestic support, including AMS 
and blue box, leading to the elimination of 
such support and thus the removal of 
disparities in the levels of this support 
provided by countries 













cooperation to assist 




developing countries.            
 







Annex 2 criteria 
should be 
permanently 
recognized as not 
countervailable. 
Canada proposes that the agricultural 
negotiations pursue and develop an overall 
limit on the amount of support of all types 
(green, blue and amber) provided to 
agriculture, so as to ensure that the reform 
program reduces inequities.   
   
The Congo  Improvement of the 
Green Box. 
  Improvement of the 
Amber Box:  
possibility for the 
least-developed 
countries to go 
beyond their base 
level AMS. 
Development box 
should include all 
financial undertakings 









be given not only to a 




but also to cases of 
force majeure (war, 
natural disasters) for 
the implementation of 
rules and 
commitments.            
 
   
Croatia        Emphasizes the necessity of specific 
provisions that would exempt investment 
subsidies and input subsidies generally 
available to agriculture, interest subsidies to 
reduce the costs of financing as well as grants 
to cover debt repayment from domestic 
support reduction commitments that would 
otherwise be applicable to such measures.  It 
would also increase the de minimis threshold 
applicable to the transition economies.  
Cuba, et al.  Collapse all domestic support categories into one ‘General Subsidies’ 
box. 
A common level of support should be allowed, which is non-
actionable.  Subsidies of 5 per cent above this level will be ‘actionable’ 
for developed countries. 
Flexibility should be 
provided to 
developing countries 
in the form of a 
‘Development’ box. 
The Due Restraint 
Clause protecting 
Green Box subsidies 
from challenge should 
be terminated as soon 
as possible            
 






Developed countries, which currently utilize extensive domestic 
support mechanisms, should agree to substantially reduce the levels 
of such support, and, for the purpose of clarity and transparency, 
grant support on a disaggregated product-by-product basis. 
Such reductions, with a substantial up-front down payment, should be 
made across the color gamut of boxes.  Measures allowed under 
Annex 2 should be reviewed for their compatibility with non-trade 
distortion. 
Greater flexibility 
should be granted to 
developing country 
Members to increase 
their levels of 
domestic support 
within the framework 
of Green Box (Annex 
II) measures. 
An urgent review of 
the ‘Due Restraint’ 
provisions is needed, 
as its use has been 
proven to constitute 
an additional window 
for some Members to 
unfairly support their 
agricultural sectors.            
 






The concept of the 
green box must be 
maintained. 
 
Criteria to be met by 
measures that fall 
into the “green box” 
be revisited to ensure 
minimal trade 
distortion whilst at the 
same time ensuring 
appropriate coverage 
of measures which 
meet important 
societal goals. 
The concept of the 
blue box must be 
maintained. 
 
The reform process 
should be pursued by 
further reduction in the 
total AMS starting from 
the Final Bound 
Commitment level, by a 
further strengthening of 
the rules concerning 
non-product specific 
domestic support, and 
by a reduction of the de 
minimis clause for 
developed countries. 
 
Specific discipline be 
applied to variable 
“amber box” subsidies 
which boost export 
performance through 
providing compensation 
for variations in market 
prices. 
The EC propose that 
measures to promote 
the sustainable vitality 
of rural areas and the 
food security concerns 
of developing countries 
as a means of poverty 
alleviation, where 
appropriate, be 
exempted from any 
reduction 
commitments. 
The EC propose that 
other ways are 
examined in order to 
provide the necessary 
flexibility for countries 
to address 
development concerns, 
notably through a 
revision of the de 
minimis clause for 
developing countries. 
The EC propose that 
measures aimed at 
protecting the 
environment, 
sustainable vitality of 
rural areas and poverty 
alleviation should be 
accommodated in the 
Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Such 
measures should be 
well targeted, 
transparent, and 
implemented in no more 
than minimally trade-
distorting ways. 
Application of the 
precautionary principle 
should be clarified. 
Ensure that labeling 
schemes are 
appropriately covered 
by the WTO.            
 






Direct Payments along with decoupled income support and 
Governmental financial participation in income insurance and income 
safety-net programs as well as direct payments under production 
limiting programs should be included in the non-product-specific AMS 
and subject to reduction commitment so as not to exceed the de 
minimis level, i.e., 5 per cent (for developed countries) and 10 per 
cent (for developing countries) of the value of that Member’s total 
agricultural production. 
 
The total domestic support should be brought down below the de 
minimis level within a maximum period of three-years by developed 
countries and in five years by the developing country Members. The 
developed countries should make a down payment by the end of the 
year 2001, through a 50 per cent reduction in the domestic support 
from the level maintained during the year 2000; or by the amount as is 
higher than the de minimis, whichever is lower. 
 
Negative product specific support figures should be allowed to be 
adjusted against the positive non-product-specific AMS support 
figures.  While product specific support should be calculated at the 
aggregate level, support to any one particular commodity should not 
be allowed to exceed the double of the de minimis limit of that 
commodity, as prescribed under Article 6.4. 
All measures taken 
by developing 





agriculture should be 





support provided to 
low-income resource 
poor farmers should 
be excluded from the 
AMS calculations, as 
is the case for the 
non-product-specific 
support as per para. 





notifying the domestic 
support in a stable 
currency/basket of 
currencies should be 
adopted for taking into 
account the incidence 
of inflation and 
exchange rate 
variations. 
            
 






The requirements for 
decoupled income 
support should be 
improved, in order to 
reflect the real 
situation of 
production. 
In view of introducing 
safety-net programs it 
is appropriate to ease 
the requirements on 




as well as the 




The “Blue Box” 
measures, which are 
exempt from the 
reduction 
commitment, should 
be maintained.  
It is unreasonable to 
set the level of AMS 
as a fixed percentage 
of each Member’s 
total agricultural 
production.   
 
The base level of the 
total AMS should be 
equivalent to the final 
commitment level in 
the year 2000 
(ceiling) in order to 
secure the continuity 
of agricultural policy 
reform. 
 
              
 
   
Jordan  Green Box should be 
maintained. However, 
criteria should be 
reviewed to ensure 
that all such domestic 
support meets the 
fundamental 
requirements of no or 
at most minimal trade 
distorting effects or 




which are exempt 
from the reduction 
commitment, could 
be maintained since 
this can be useful in 
converting trade-
distorting support to 
less trade-distorting 
support; however, it 
should be subject to 
reduction 
commitments leading 
to their elimination. 





specific AMS support 
figures should be 
allowed. 
 
All measures taken by developing countries 
for poverty alleviation, rural development, rural 
employment, desert reclamation and 
diversification of agriculture should be 
exempted from any reduction commitments. 
 
Direct or indirect measures that are an integral 
part of the development programs of 
developing countries, including investment 
and input subsidies, as identified in Article 6.2 
of the present Agreement, must remain 
exempt from reduction commitments during 
the next phase of the reform program.            
 
   
Kenya    All trade-distorting subsidies utilized by 
developed countries should be completely 
eliminated.   Developing countries should not 
be expected to undertake any further 
liberalization commitments until this is 
accomplished.   
A Development Box 
should be designed 







countries.   
The Peace Clause 
should not be 
extended beyond 
2003.  However, 
domestic support 
measures provided by 
developing countries 
within the framework 
of Food 
Security/Development 
Box and those under 
Article 6.2 should be 
made totally non-
actionable.             
 






The scope and 
criteria of Green Box 
should be adjusted to 
be more flexible so 
that the 
multifunctionality of 
agriculture can be 
properly reflected. 
The Blue Box should 
be maintained since it 
can be useful in 
converting trade-
distorting support to 
less trade-distorting 
support.  
  Given different 
developmental 




should be able to 
implement 
agricultural policies 
that fit its domestic 
situation. 
The following 
measures should also 







for Enhancing Income 
Safety Net; Supports 
for Small-scale Family 
Farm Households; 
Supports for 
Agricultural and Rural 
Development in 
Developing Countries            
 
   
Mexico  The green box should 
be maintained, and 
hence, the provisions 
relating to those 
domestic support 
measures in favor of 
agricultural producers 
that are not subject to 
a reduction 
commitment because 
they conform to the 
criteria set forth in 
Annex 2 of the 
Agreement on 
Agriculture, as well 
as the said Annex 2 
criteria, should 
remain unchanged. 
Contrary to what was 
agreed in the 
Uruguay Round, the 
amounts allocated to 
blue box programs 
should be reduced at 
an accelerated pace. 
The reduction in the 
Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS) should 
be as substantial as 
possible. 
Given that it is the 
amber box domestic 
support measures that 
most distort production 
and trade, reductions 
should considerably 
exceed those applied 
during the Uruguay 
Round. 
These reductions 
should be greater in the 
developed countries, 
where such instruments 
are used more 
extensively, than in the 
developing countries. 




countries with respect 
to domestic support 
should be maintained 
and improved. 
The measures 
adopted under Article 
6.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture should 
not be subject to 
countervailing 
measures. 
The stability of the 
programs being 
implemented by many 
Members, in particular 
developing country 
Members, in 
conformity with the 
results of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, 
should not be 
affected.            
 






Green box measures 
be redefined and 
eliminate measures 
that create trade 
distortions; 
upper limits be 
imposed for these 
measures when they 
have a negative 
impact. 
 
Elimination, over a 
period of five years, 
of blue box subsidies. 
For developed 
countries: a reduction 
of 10 per cent of the 
amounts effectively 
granted during the 




period with a view to 
the final elimination of 
the subsidies; a 50 
per cent reduction, if 
not the complete 
elimination, of the de 
minimis threshold. 
 
For the developing 
countries a rise in the 
AMS level  or at least 
no commitment to 
reducing the AMS. 
New provisions be 
introduced in the 
Special and 
Differential Treatment 
category that account 




            
 
   
Namibia  Green Box measures 
should be quantified 
and disciplined. 
Blue Box measures 
should be quantified, 
capped and using a 
formula be eliminated 
over a period of time. 
De minimis levels 
and the AMS 
provisions should be 
revised to consider 
countries whose 
rates are negative or 
zero. 
  Supports a time 
bound, formula 
approach that will lead 
to the gradual 
elimination of all forms 







The Green Box 
should be 
maintained.  
The Blue Box should 
be maintained. 
Based on existing 
bound commitments, 
AMS should be 
divided into domestic 
support to agricultural 
production destined 
for the domestic 




would be subject to 
further reductions. 
Special attention 
must be paid to the 
needs of developing 
countries in the area 
of domestic support. 
Monetary domestic 
support commitments 
should be subject to 
annual inflation 
adjustments.            
 






      Negotiations should 
recognize the need 
for flexibility for 
developing countries 
in domestic support 
measures to address 
the concerns of the 
rural population in 
this sector for the 
sustenance of their 
livelihood and 
employment;  and 
attainment of a 
certain degree of 
food self sufficiency 
to ensure that all/any 
measures aimed at 
enhancing domestic 
production is exempt 
from reduction 
commitments 
To ensure equity and 
a balance of 
obligations, 
developing countries 
should be allowed to 
take new measures, 
for instance in the 
area of domestic 
support, up to levels 
substantially higher 
than the de minimis 
levels.            
 






  Poland proposes to 
assure the right of 
every Member to 
introduce and 
maintain “blue box” 
payments. 
Poland is prepared to 
undertake 
negotiations for 
further reduction of 
bound, specified in 
the schedules, levels 
of the AMS according 
to the UR formula. 
   
Senegal  Allow developing countries the full possibility of giving internal support to the agricultural 
sector with a view to ensuring food security, preserving jobs in rural areas and reducing 
poverty;  introduce flexible measures in their favor for this purpose.   
 
Give developing countries with low agricultural production flexibility in all instruments relating 
to agricultural production, to enable them to undertake reforms necessary for maintaining their 
level of food production in the short term and significantly improving agricultural productivity in 
the long term;  envisage replacing criteria in the form of deadlines, which are often fixed 
arbitrarily, with objectively verifiable economic indicators, based in particular on the level of 
development or growth of the sector;  accordingly, make provision for revising the deadlines 
granted to developing countries, in particular as regards the granting of marketing subsidies 
provided for under Articles 9.4 and 9.1(d) and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture.   
            
 






Since the green box 
can contain only 
measures that have 
little or no impact on 
production and trade, 
we must exclude an 
absolute multilateral 
ceiling. 
As regards amber and blue boxes, 
Switzerland proposes waiting to negotiate the 
criteria and scope of the different instruments 
until an understanding has been reached in 
principle on the instruments to be applied with 
respect to non-trade concerns.  






      Exempt investment 
subsidies and input 
subsidies for the 
transition economies.  
Increase the de 
minimis threshold 
applicable to the 
transition economies 
            
 






Turkey supports the 
continuation of green 
box measures within 
the framework of 
Annex II.  In order to 
minimize any 
possible trade 
distorting effects of 
green box measures, 
Turkey proposes the 
introduction of clear 
definitions and set of 
rules 
    Domestic support over de minimis level should 
be reduced substantially or be eliminated, 
while de minimis level for developing countries 
should be increased to a mutually agreed 
level. 
Developing countries should be granted the 
flexibility to apply de minimis on an aggregate 
basis, instead of product basis, taking into 
consideration the changing production 
conditions. 
Special and Differential Treatment granted for 
developing countries should be continued to 
be exempted from reduction commitments.            
 








into two categories: 
support exempt from 
any reduction 
commitment and 
support that is not 
exempt from 
reduction 
commitment.  Exempt 
support would have 
no, or at most, 
minimal trade 
distorting effects or 
effects on production; 
all other domestic 
support (non-exempt) 
would be subject to a 
reduction 
commitment 
  Members with a final 
bound AMS in their 
schedules to commit 
to reduce the level of 
non-exempt support.  
Reductions would 
start from the final 
bound AMS and be 
reduced to a final 
bound level equal to 
a fixed percentage of 
the members’ value 
of total agricultural 
production in a fixed 
base period. 
Create additional 
criteria for exempt 
support measures 
deemed essential to 
the development and 
food security objectives 
of developing countries 
to facilitate the 
development of 





systems, help farmers 
manage risk, provide 







            
 
   
 
 